

[Submitting Counsel on Signature Page]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: SOCIAL MEDIA ADOLESCENT
ADDICTION/PERSONAL INJURY
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:

People of the State of California, et al.

v.

Meta Platforms, Inc., Instagram, LLC, Meta
Payments, Inc., Meta Platforms Technologies,
LLC

Office of the Attorney General, State of Florida,
Department of Legal Affairs

v.

Meta Platforms, Inc., Instagram, LLC., Meta
Payments, Inc.

State of Montana, ex rel. Austin Knudsen,
Attorney General

v.

Meta Platforms, Inc., Instagram, LLC, Facebook
Holdings, LLC, Facebook Operations, LLC,
Meta Payments, Inc., Meta Platforms
Technologies, LLC, Siculus, Inc.

MDL No. 3047

Case No. 4:22-md-03047-YGR

4:23-cv-05448-YGR

4:23-cv-05885-YGR

4:24-cv-00805-YGR

**STATE AGS' REPLY TO PI/SD
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO THE
STATE AGS' MOTION TO CERTIFY
FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)**

Judge: Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers

Magistrate Judge: Hon. Peter H. Kang

1 I. INTRODUCTION

2 The PI/SD Plaintiffs fail to overcome the State AGs’ showing that an immediate appeal is
 3 warranted. *See* (Dkt. 1615). Whether Section 230 immunizes Meta for violating numerous state
 4 laws with its injurious and deceptive scheme to addict children to its social-media platforms,
 5 irrespective of any third-party content published, is (1) a controlling legal question, (2) subject to
 6 substantial legal disagreement, and (3) a determination that would materially advance the
 7 litigation. In short, determining this question now will avoid potential successive trials,
 8 substantially alter the claims and relief available, and meaningfully determine whether, and to
 9 what extent, the State AGs can protect their child and parent constituents from harm.

10 II. ARGUMENT

11 A. The AGs seek certification of pure questions of law.

12 PI/SD Plaintiffs’ argument that the State AGs propose a mixed question of law and fact—
 13 rather than a controlling question of law—is both wrong and not determinative. The State AGs
 14 seek review of a basic and threshold question of law: whether Section 230 shields social media
 15 companies from state-law claims targeting the companies’ own conduct and platform design
 16 irrespective of any third-party content published. This question is as-yet unanswered by this
 17 Circuit and is the subject of recent—and potentially divergent—Circuit treatment. *See Anderson*
 18 *v. TikTok, Inc.*, 116 F.4th 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2024) (“Section 230 immunizes only information
 19 ‘provided by another[,]’ 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1), and here, because the information that forms the
 20 basis of Anderson’s lawsuit—i.e., TikTok’s recommendations via its FYP algorithm—is
 21 TikTok’s own expressive activity, § 230 does not bar Anderson’s claims.”).

22 Most telling is that PI/SD Plaintiffs do not challenge the existence of substantial grounds
 23 for a difference of opinion on this question of law. Nor could they. As discussed in the State AGs’
 24 Motion, several state courts have recently mirrored the Third Circuit’s approach, concluding that
 25 Section 230 does not extend to social media website design decisions similar to those at issue in
 26 this case. *See* (Dkt. No. 1534, p. 10, n.4).

27 The Ninth Circuit’s answer to this question will have a material and controlling effect on
 28 the scope of claims and breadth of available injunctive relief—that is, whether the State AGs will

1 be able to target Meta’s unfair conduct as related to several addictive platform features, such as
 2 infinite scroll and autoplay, ephemeral content, notifications and alerts, “Likes,” and the
 3 algorithmic display of content. *In re Cement Antitrust Litig.*, 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1981)
 4 (“[A]ll that must be shown in order for a question to be ‘controlling’ is that resolution of the issue
 5 on appeal could materially affect the outcome of litigation in the district court.”).

6 PI/SD Plaintiffs’ cited cases do not establish that the AGs’ proposed question is a mixed
 7 question of fact and law. First, *Guidiville Rancheria of California v. United States*, No. 12-CV-
 8 1326-YGR, 2014 WL 5020036, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2014), is inapposite. In that case, Judge
 9 Gonzalez Rogers merely explained, unremarkably, that “garden-variety issues of correct
 10 application of the law to the facts” do not present “controlling questions of law.” And, second,
 11 *Lemmon v. Snap, Inc.*, 995 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021), actually supports the State AGs’ point.
 12 There, parents brought a design defect claim against Snap, Inc., and the Ninth Circuit *denied*
 13 *Section 230 immunity* to Snap. *Id.* at 1087. The Court did not engage in a fact-heavy analysis
 14 about the design features. Rather, it merely accepted the complaint’s facts as true at the motion to
 15 dismiss stage, *id.*, and engaged in an abstract legal discussion of whether the design defect claims
 16 targeted Snap as a “publisher,” *id.* at 1091–93. It concluded the claims did not do so, because they
 17 “turn[ed] on Snap’s design of Snapchat.” *Id.* at 1091. The same threshold legal analysis is called
 18 for here.

19 As explained in the State AGs’ Motion, it is appropriate that the Ninth Circuit decide the
 20 similar and controlling question of law: whether Section 230 protects Meta’s design of Facebook
 21 and Instagram.

22 **B. Interlocutory review may materially advance the ultimate termination of this**
 23 **litigation.**

24 Interlocutory review would materially advance this litigation by streamlining the issues
 25 and avoiding a costly second trial if the Ninth Circuit eventually holds that Section 230 does not
 26 immunize Meta from its widespread violations of numerous state consumer-protection laws
 27 alleged here. None of the PI/SD Plaintiffs’ arguments alter that conclusion.
 28

1 *First*, the fact that one motion to dismiss (related to PI/SD Plaintiffs’ non-priority claims)
 2 is outstanding does not risk piecemeal appeals. Most of the motions to dismiss have been ruled
 3 on, including those related to PI/SD Plaintiffs’ priority claims and the State AGs’ claims. PI/SD
 4 Plaintiffs do not allege that the one remaining motion contains legal issues that may alter this
 5 Court’s prior decisions establishing the law of the case related to Section 230. The issue is thus
 6 ripe for comprehensive consideration by the Ninth Circuit.

7 *Second*, PI/SD Plaintiffs’ argument that an interlocutory appeal would “detract from this
 8 MDL’s current momentum” is misplaced. Currently, trial is not scheduled. The earliest
 9 conceivable date is at least a year away. It does not appear that any party is requesting a stay at
 10 this time. PI/SD Plaintiffs’ argument that interlocutory appeal was too early before, but too late
 11 now, leaves no room for any interlocutory appeal. Moreover, their assertion that the potential of
 12 delaying a trial should preclude appellate review is much less relevant in the context of a
 13 sprawling MDL where earlier resolution of issues can create more efficiencies. *See Steering*
 14 *Comm. v. United States*, 6 F.3d 572, 575 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding “the liability phase of a
 15 *multidistrict, multiparty case* of the sort at hand is appealable under § 1292(b)” (emphasis
 16 added)); *also In re Cintas Corp. Overtime Pay Arb. Litig.*, 2007 WL 1302496, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
 17 May 2, 2007) (recognizing that interlocutory review is “particularly appropriate in the context of
 18 MDL proceedings”).

19 *Third*, that the State AGs’ appeal could “at most” add “five features” to their consumer
 20 protection claims is not evidence that it would have little impact on the litigation. To the contrary,
 21 those five features—infinite scroll and autoplay, ephemeral content, disruptive audiovisual and
 22 vibration notifications, quantification and display of “likes”, and algorithmic service of content—
 23 constitute the core of the AGs’ claims of Facebook’s and Instagram’s unfairness, and the features
 24 most plausibly targeted for injunctive relief.

25 Determination, now, of Section 230’s protection of those features will materially advance
 26 the termination of this litigation.

1 **III. CONCLUSION**

2 For all these reasons, in addition to the reasons explained in the State AGs' motion, (Dkt.
3 1534), the State AGs respectfully request that this Court certify its motion to dismiss order
4 covering the State AGs' claims, *i.e.*, the "State AG Order," (22-md-03047, Dkt. 1214; 23-cv-
5 05448, Dkt. 123) for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

6
7 Dated: February 4, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

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